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Bats have been identified as a natural reservoir for an
increasing number of emerging zoonotic viruses, including
henipaviruses and variants of rabies viruses. Recently, we
and another group independently identified several horse-
shoe bat species (genus Rhinolophus) as the reservoir host
for a large number of viruses that have a close genetic rela-
tionship with the coronavirus associated with severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS). Our current research
focused on the identification of the reservoir species for the
progenitor virus of the SARS coronaviruses responsible for
outbreaks during 2002–2003 and 2003–2004. In addition to
SARS-like coronaviruses, many other novel bat coron-
aviruses, which belong to groups 1 and 2 of the 3 existing
coronavirus groups, have been detected by PCR. The dis-
covery of bat SARS-like coronaviruses and the great
genetic diversity of coronaviruses in bats have shed new
light on the origin and transmission of SARS coronaviruses. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) represents
the 21st century’s first pandemic of a transmissible dis-
ease with a previously unknown cause. The pandemic start-
ed in November 2002 and was brought under control in
July 2003, after it had spread to 33 countries on 5 conti-
nents, resulting in >8,000 infections and >700 deaths (1).
The outbreaks were caused by a newly emerged coron-
avirus, now known as the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV).
In late 2003 and early 2004, sporadic outbreaks were
reported in the region of the People’s Republic of China
where the 2002–2003 outbreaks originated (2). However,
molecular epidemiologic studies showed that the viruses
responsible for the 2003–2004 outbreaks were not the
same as those isolated during the 2002–2003 outbreaks
(3). These findings indicate independent species-crossing
events. They also indicate that a SARS epidemic may recur
in the future and that SARS-like coronaviruses (SARS-
like–CoVs) that originate from different reservoir host
populations may lead to epidemics at different times or in
different regions, depending on the distribution of the
reservoirs and transmitting hosts. The recent discovery of
a group of diverse SARS-like–CoVs in bats supports the
possibility of these events and further highlights the need
to understand reservoir distribution and transmission to
prevent future outbreaks.
Animal Origin of SARS Coronaviruses
Because of the sudden and unpredictable nature of the
SARS outbreaks that started in November 2002 in south-
ern People’s Republic of China, structured and reliable
epidemiologic studies to conclusively trace the origin of
SARS-CoV were not conducted. However, accumulated
studies from different groups, which used a variety of
approaches, indicated an animal origin on the basis of the
following findings. 1) Genome sequencing indicated that
SARS-CoV is a new virus with no genetic relatedness to
any known human coronaviruses (4,5). 2) Retrospective
serologic studies found no evidence of seroprevalence to
SARS-CoV or related viruses in the human population (6).
3) Serologic surveys among market traders during the
2002–2003 outbreaks showed that antibodies against
SARS-CoVor related viruses were present at a higher ratio
in animal traders than control populations (7–9). 4) Epi-
demiologic studies indicated that early case-patients were
more likely than later case-patients to report living near a
produce market but not near a farm, and almost half of
them were food handlers with probable animal contact (7).
5) SARS-CoVs isolated from animals in markets were
almost identical to human isolates (9). 6) Molecular epi-
demiologic analyses indicated that human SARS-CoV iso-
lates could be divided into 3 groups from the early, middle,
and late phases of the outbreaks and that early-phase iso-
lates were more closely related to the animal isolates (10).
7) Human SARS-CoVs isolates from the 2003–2004 out-
breaks had higher sequence identity to animal isolates of
the same period than to human isolates from the
2002–2003 outbreaks (3).
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The first evidence of SARS-CoV infection in animals
came from a study conducted in a live animal market in
early 2003 (9). From the 25 animals sampled, viruses
closely related to SARS-CoV were detected in 3 masked
palm civets (Paguma larvata) and 1 raccoon dog
(Nyctereutes procyonoides). In addition, neutralizing anti-
bodies against SARS-CoV were detected in 2 Chinese fer-
ret badgers (Melogale moschata). This initial study
indicated that at least 3 different animal species in the
Shenzhen market were infected by coronaviruses that are
closely related to SARS-CoV.
Given the vast number of live animals being traded in
animal markets in southern People’s Republic of China,
knowing which other animals are also susceptible to these
viruses is crucial. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons no
systematic studies were conducted on traded animals dur-
ing the outbreak period. Experimental infection of differ-
ent animals therefore became a component of the
SARS-CoV investigation.
Currently, >10 mammalian species have been proven to
be susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV or related virus-
es (Table 1). Rats were also implicated as potentially sus-
ceptible animals that may have played a role in the
transmission and spread of SARS-CoV in the well-publi-
cized SARS outbreaks in the Amoy Gardens apartment
block in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
People’s Republic of China (23). In Guangdong in 2004,
the first human with a confirmed case of SARS was report-
ed to have had no contact with any animals except rats (2).
Experimentally, we have obtained serologic evidence that
SARS-CoV replicates asymptomatically in rats (B.T.
Eaton et al., unpub. data). Further studies are needed to
clarify the potential role of rats in the transmission of
SARS-CoV. Studies by 2 independent groups suggested
that avian species were not susceptible to SARS-CoV
infection and that, hence, domestic poultry were unlikely
to be the reservoir or associated with the dissemination of
SARS-CoV in the animal markets of southern People’s
Republic of China (22,24).
Role of Masked Palm Civets
Although in 1 live animal market, 3 species were found
to be infected by viruses related to SARS-CoV (9), all sub-
sequent studies have focused mainly on palm civets, pos-
sibly because the rate of detection was higher in civets or
because the number of civets traded in southern People’s
Republic of China exceeds that of other wildlife groups.
The isolation of closely related SARS-CoV in civets
during the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 outbreaks and the
close match of virus sequences between the human and
civet isolates from each outbreak (3,9,25) strongly suggest
that civets are a direct source of human infection.
However, these studies did not clarify whether animals
other than civets were involved in transmission of SARS-
CoV to humans or whether civets were an intermediate
host or the natural reservoir host of SARS-CoVs.
During the 2002–2003 outbreaks, none of the animal
traders surveyed in the markets, who supposedly had very
close contact with live civets, displayed SARS symptoms
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SARS patient had had no contact with civets (2). These
observations seem to indicate that ≥1 other animal species
may play a role in transmission of SARS-CoV to humans.
Most, if not all, civets traded in the markets are not truly
wildlife animals; rather, they are farmed animals. Civet
farming is relatively new in People’s Republic of China and
has rapidly expanded during the past 15 years or so. Tu et
al. conducted the first comparative study of market and
farmed civets (26). Serologic testing was performed on 103
serum samples taken from civets in an animal market in
Guangdong and several civet farms in different regions of
People’s Republic of China in June 2003 and January 2004.
No significant level of SARS-CoV antibody was detected
in any of the 75 samples taken from 6 farms in 3 provinces.
In contrast, of the 18 samples taken from an animal market
in Guangdong Province in January 2004, 14 (79%) had
neutralizing antibodies to SARS-CoV.
In a parallel study conducted between January and
September 2004 (27), molecular analysis was used to
investigate the distribution of SARS-CoV in palm civets in
markets and on farms. PCR analysis of samples from 91
palm civets and 15 raccoon dogs in 1 animal market and
1,107 civets from 25 farms in 12 provinces showed posi-
tive results for all animals from the market and negative
results for all animals from the farms. Similar results were
obtained in wild-trapped civets in Hong Kong; none of the
21 wild civets sampled had positive antibody or PCR
results for SARS-CoV (28).
Although not universally true, natural reservoir hosts
tend to have coevolved with their viruses and usually do
not display clinical signs of infection (29). However, when
palm civets were experimentally infected with 2 strains of
human SARS-CoV, all developed clinical signs of fever,
lethargy, and loss of aggressiveness (11).
Civits’ high susceptibility to SARS-CoV infection and
wide presence in markets and restaurants strongly indi-
cates an important role for civets in the 2002–2003 and
2003–2004 SARS outbreaks. However, the lack of wide-
spread infection in wild or farmed palm civets makes them
unlikely to have been the natural reservoir host.
SARS-like Coronaviruses in Bats
The presence of SARS-like–CoVs in different species of
horseshoe bats in the genus Rhinolophus has recently been
reported. We found, in a study of horseshoe bat species in
different regions of mainland People’s Republic of China in
2004 (30), that each of the 4 species surveyed had evidence
of infection by a SARS-like–CoV: 2 species (R. pearsoni
and R. macrotis) had positive results by both serologic and
PCR tests, and 2 (R. pussilus and R. ferrumequinum) had
positive results by either serologic or PCR tests, respective-
ly. Bats with positive results were detected in the provinces
of Hubei and Guangxi, which are >1,000 km apart. Agroup
in Hong Kong (31) found that, when analyzed by PCR, 23
(39%) of 59 anal swabs of wild Chinese horseshoe bats (R.
sinicus) contained genetic material closely related to
SARS-CoV. They also found that as many as 84% of the
horseshoe bats examined contained antibodies to a recom-
binant N protein of SARS-CoV. Aprevious study indicated
a certain level of antigenic cross-reactivity between SARS-
CoV and some group 1 coronaviruses (6) and that several
group 1 coronaviruses had recently been found in bats.
Therefore, the actual seropositive proportion of R. sinicus
might be <84%. Nevertheless, the relatively high sero-
prevalence and wide distribution of seropositive bats is
consistent with the serologic pattern expected from a
pathogen’s natural reservoir host (29).
Genome sequencing showed that the genome organiza-
tion of all bat SARS-like–CoVs is almost identical to that
of the SARS-CoVs isolated from humans or civets. They
shared an overall sequence identity of 88% to 92%. The
most variable regions were located in the 5′ end of the S
gene, which codes for the S1 domain responsible for
receptor binding, and in open reading frame 10 (ORF10 or
ORF8, depending on the nomenclature used) region imme-
diately upstream from the N gene (Figure, panel A, region
b), which is known to be also prone to deletions of various
sizes (3,9). Most human SARS-CoVs isolated during the
late phase of the 2002–2003 outbreaks have a 29-nt dele-
tion in this region; this deletion is absent in the civet iso-
lates or human isolates from the early phase of the
outbreaks (3,9). The bat viruses also lack the 29-nt dele-
tion, indicating that SARS-CoVs and SARS-like–CoVs
share a common ancestor.
Furthermore, sequence analyses indicated the existence
of a much greater genetic diversity of SARS-like–CoVs in
bats than of SARS-CoVs in civets or humans, which sup-
ports the notion that SARS-CoV is a member of this novel
coronavirus group and that bats are a natural reservoir for
it. The overall genome sequence identities between the
human/civit SARS-CoVs and the bat viruses Rp3 (isolated
from R. pearsoni) and HKU3–1 (isolated from R. sinicus)
were 92% and 88%, respectively. The sequence identity
between the bat isolates Rp3 and HKU3–1 is 89%, which
indicates that the genetic divergence among the bat isolates
is as great as the divergence between each of the bat virus-
es and the human/civet isolates. In addition, phylogenetic
trees based on different protein sequences display different
tree topologies, as shown in the Figure (panel B), which
indicates the existence of multiple evolutionary pathways
for different regions of the genome.
Diversity of Coronaviruses in Bats
The discovery of SARS-CoV has boosted the search for
novel coronaviruses of human and animal origin. Bats
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species diversity, large population size, broad geographic
distribution, ability for long-distance migration, and habit
of roosting in large groups. In addition to the SARS-
like–CoVs described above, many other coronaviruses
have been detected by PCR among diverse bat populations
in Hong Kong (Table 2).
Poon et al. (28) conducted a surveillance study in Hong
Kong during the summers of 2003 and 2004. From 162
swab samples collected from 12 bat species, they detected
a novel group 1 coronavirus by sequencing of PCR prod-
ucts from the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp)
gene. The same virus or viruses of the same genetic line-
age were found in 3 Miniopterus species (M. pusillus, M.
magnater, and M. schreibersii). However, attempts to iso-
late virus by using 3 different cell lines (MDCK, FRhK4,
and VeroE6) were unsuccessful.
In another study in Hong Kong during April 2004–July
2005, Woo et al. (32) sampled 309 individual bats repre-
senting 13 species from 20 different locations in rural
Hong Kong. They detected coronavirus-related viral
genomic RNA in 37 bats, representing a prevalence of
12%. Partial sequencing of RdRp and helicase genes iden-
tified 8 coronavirus genome types, 2 of which were the
same as those reported previously (28,30,31). The other 6
novel types of coronaviruses were obtained from 6 differ-
ent bat species and phylogenetically positioned in 2 of the
existing 3 coronavirus groups. Four were in group 1,
derived from bat species M. magnater, M. pusillus, Myotis
ricketti, and R. sinicus; the other 2 were in group 2, from
bat species Pipistrellus abramus and Tylonycteris pachy-
pus. To accommodate the newly discovered genetic diver-
sity of group 2 coronaviruses, the authors proposed the
following subdivisions: group 2a (coronaviruses existing
before the discovery of SARS-CoV), group 2b (SARS-
CoV and SARS-like–CoVs), and group 2c (novel bat coro-
naviruses discovered in this study). Attempts to isolate
virus in VeroE6, MRC-5, LLC-Mk2, FRhK-4, Huh-7.5,
and HRT-18 were unsuccessful.
In another extensive study conducted in mainland
People’s Republic of China during November 2004–
March 2006, Tang et al. (33) collected samples from 985
bats: 35 species in 14 genera and 3 families at 82 different
sites in 15 provinces. A total of 64 (6.5%) bats had posi-
tive results from a PCR directed to a highly conserved
440-bp RdRp region. Among the 64 PCR-positive prod-
ucts sequenced, only 3 (all from the genus Rhinolophus)
were clustered with known bat SARS-like–CoVs (or
group 2b), 40 belonged to group 1, and the remaining 22
formed a separate cluster in group 2, most likely cluster-
ing with the group 2c viruses reported by Woo et al. (32).
Attempts to isolate virus in VeroE6, FRHK4, and CV1
were unsuccessful.
In addition to the diversity of coronaviruses in bats, 3
more observations can be drawn from these studies. First,
none of the bat coronaviruses discovered so far belonged
to group 3. Second, with very few exceptions, most bat
coronaviruses seem to be species-specific; i.e., different
bat species from a similar location harbor different coron-
aviruses, whereas the same bat species from different geo-
graphic locations carry coronaviruses of the same genetic
lineage (32,33). Third, among the 5 published studies
involving bat coronaviruses (28,30–33), no researchers
were able to isolate live virus from any of the swab sam-
ples collected despite the use of many different cell lines
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Figure. A) Genome diagram indicating the location of structural
(dark arrow) and nonstructural (shaded arrow) genes and the dif-
ferent regions (shaded boxes) used for phylogeny analysis.
B) Phylogenetic trees based on deduced amino acid sequences of
the spike protein S1 domain (a), the open reading frame (ORF)10'
(b), and the N protein (c). Because of lack of the ORF10' coding
region in Tor2, Tor2 could not be included for the tree in (b). GD01,
human isolate from early phase of the outbreak in 2003; Tor2,
human isolate from late phase of the outbreak in 2003; SZ3, civet
isolate from March 2003; Rp3, bat isolate from Rhinolophus pear-
soni, December 2004; Rf1, bat isolate from R. ferrumequinum,
November 2004; Rm1, bat isolate from R. macrotis, November
2004; and HKU3-1, bat isolate from R. sinicus, February 2005.
GenBank accession nos. appear next to isolate names.and the presence of high levels of viral genetic materials
shown by quantitative PCR.
Cross-species Transmission
Emergence of zoonotic viruses from a wildlife reservoir
requires 4 events: 1) interspecies contact, 2) cross-species
virus transmission (i.e., spillover), 3) sustained transmis-
sion, and 4) virus adaptation within the spillover species
(34). These 4 transition events occurred during the SARS
outbreaks and contributed to the rapid spread of the disease
around the world.
The role of civets in directly transmitting SARS-CoVto
humans has been well established. The most convincing
case was the infection of a waitress and a customer in a
restaurant where SARS-CoV–positive civets were housed
in cages (25). Two key questions remain: What is the nat-
ural reservoir host for the outbreak SARS-CoV strains, and
how were the viruses transmitted to civets or other inter-
mediate hosts? Although not conclusive, the data obtained
so far strongly suggest that bats (horseshoe bats in partic-
ular) are most likely the reservoir host of SARS-CoV. As
indicated above, bat coronaviruses seem to be species-spe-
cific and SARS-like–CoVs discovered so far are exclu-
sively associated with horseshoe bats. We hope that
continued field study will eventually identify the direct
progenitor of SARS-CoV among the 69 different known
horseshoe species. The facts that the cross-species trans-
mission of SARS-CoV seems to be a relatively rare event
and that legal and illegal trading of wildlife animals
between People’s Republic of China and other countries
occurs raise the possibility that the natural reservoir
species may not be native to People’s Republic of China.
Thus, we should expand our search into regions other than
Hong Kong and mainland People’s Republic of China.
Another approach to search for the natural reservoir of
SARS-CoV is to conduct infection experiments in differ-
ent bat species. If we assume that the progenitor viruses
come from bats, chances are high that the human/civet
SARS-CoVs are still capable of infecting the original
reservoir species.
Without knowing the natural reservoir of SARS-CoV,
predicting the exact mechanism of transmission from
reservoir host to intermediate host is difficult. However,
the fecal-oral route represents the main mode of transmis-
sion among animals. Although mixing of live reservoir
hosts (e.g., bats) and intermediate hosts (e.g., civets) would
be an efficient means of transmission, the main source of
cross-species transmission in the animal trading chain
(including warehouses, transportation vehicles, markets)
may come from contaminated feces, urine, blood, or
aerosols. This may also be true for civet-to-human trans-
mission. As shown in the case of the infected restaurant
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civets and was sitting at a table ≈5 m from the civet cages
(25).
Although at this stage we cannot rule out the possibili-
ty of direct transmission from the natural reservoir host to
humans, molecular epidemiologic studies (2,10) and stud-
ies of the receptor-S protein interaction (35) indicate that
the progenitor viruses are unlikely to be able to infect
humans and that a rapid viral evolution in an intermediate
host (such as civets) seems to be necessary to adapt the
virus for human infection. Ability to efficiently use the
receptor molecules (ACE2 for human and civet) seems to
be a major limiting factor for animal-to-human and
human-to-human transmission (35). This also explains
why the SARS-CoV was able to cause the human pandem-
ic but the closely related bat SARS-like–CoVs were not.
For the SARS-like–CoVs to infect humans, substantial
genetic changes in the S1 receptor-binding domain will be
necessary. These changes may be achieved in 1 of 2 possi-
ble ways. They could be achieved by genetic recombina-
tion, as coronaviruses are known to be able to recombine.
For example, bat SARS-like–CoVs and another yet
unknown coronavirus could coinfect an intermediate host,
and the bat viruses would gain the ACE2 binding site in the
S1 domain by recombination. The alternative is continuous
evolution independent of recombination. Coronaviruses in
bats could have a spectrum sufficiently diverse to encom-
pass the progenitor virus for SARS-CoVs. The progenitor
virus’s ability to bind human ACE2 may be acquired or
improved by adaptation (i.e., point mutations) in >1 inter-
mediate host before it could efficiently infect humans. The
existence of at least 3 discontinuous highly variable
genomic regions between SARS-CoV and SARS-like–
CoV indicates that the second mechanism is more likely.
In conclusion, the discovery of bat SARS-like–CoVs
and the great genetic diversity of coronaviruses in bats
have shed new light on the origin and transmission of
SARS-CoV. Although the exact natural reservoir host for
the progenitor virus of SARS-CoV is still unknown, we
believe that a continued search in different bat populations
in People’s Republic of China and neighboring countries,
combined with experimental infection of different bat
species with SARS-CoV, will eventually identify the
native reservoir species. Apositive outcome of these inves-
tigations will greatly enhance our understanding of
spillover mechanisms, which will in turn facilitate devel-
opment and implementation of effective prevention strate-
gies. The discovery of SARS-like–CoVs in bats highlights
the increasingly recognized importance of bats as reser-
voirs of emerging viruses (36). Moreover, the recent emer-
gence of SARS-CoVs and other bat-associated viruses
such as henipaviruses (37,38), Menangle, and Tioman
viruses (36), and variants of rabies viruses and bat
lyssaviruses (38,39) also supports the contention that
viruses, especially RNA viruses, possess more risk than
other pathogens for disease emergence in human and
domestic mammals because of their higher mutation rates
(40).
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